Prepared by

Abdelrahman Mohamed Mohamed Ghazala

Faculty of Economic Studies and Political Science

The Arab Republic of Egypt

Introduction

A series of questions has recently been raised: Where are the principles of public international law? Where is the system of collective security? Where is the respect for state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs? Where are the provisions of the Treaty of Westphalia that brought an end to the Thirty Years’ War? Where are the Geneva Conventions? And where is the humanity so frequently invoked by political leaders?

Such questions, though often framed as expressions of moral concern, reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of the historical origins and functional logic of international law. Public international law was not conceived as a universal moral framework; rather, it was constructed by colonial powers exhausted by the devastation of the two World Wars. These were states that possessed vast overseas empires, had plunged the international system into global conflict, caused the deaths of millions, displaced entire populations, and presided over mass famine. The collective security architecture that emerged from this period functioned primarily as a mechanism to contain a specific threat—most notably, the resurgence of German power.

Following the failure of the League of Nations, the victorious powers of the Second World War convened at Yalta, preceded by the Atlantic Charter, with a singular objective: to ensure that the catastrophes of the early twentieth century would not be repeated. To this end, authority over the international system was concentrated in the hands of five states through the institutional design of the United Nations Security Council. These five powers—Britain, China, the United States, France, and the Soviet Union (now succeeded by the Russian Federation)—were endowed with decisive influence over global affairs, including the power to authorize intervention and to veto any resolution that threatened their core interests.

These states effectively positioned themselves as the ultimate arbiters of international order. The veto power institutionalized inequality within the system, allowing the interests of the most powerful actors to prevail over those of the broader international community. Despite persistent rivalries among them, these states have never withdrawn from the United Nations, as the organization continues to serve their strategic interests. Moreover, the alignment of many UN decisions with the preferences of the United States reflects not moral consensus, but structural asymmetries of power and influence within the international system.

International law thus appears Western in character not by coincidence, but by design. It emerged as a set of rules governing interaction among major powers, rather than as a genuinely universal legal order. Norms such as the Geneva Conventions were formulated primarily to regulate warfare among states capable of mutual destruction, not to protect weaker actors lacking the means to enforce compliance.

It is, therefore, particularly troubling that such questions are often raised by specialists in political science, who ought to recognize the power-based foundations of the international legal system.

Classical political theorists anticipated this reality. Machiavelli famously emphasized that the pursuit of political objectives may require engagement with morally dubious means. Thomas Hobbes, in turn, described the state of nature as one of perpetual conflict, driven by fear, self-interest, and the struggle for survival—captured succinctly in the phrase homo homini lupus. From this perspective, conflict is not an aberration but an inherent feature of human interaction.

Both Hobbes and Immanuel Kant understood that the absence of a supreme authority in international politics renders the system fundamentally anarchic. While Kant envisioned the possibility of perpetual peace through legal and institutional development, he nonetheless acknowledged that without an overarching sovereign capable of enforcing norms, international order would remain fragile. In the absence of such authority, the international system is characterized by competition for power and dominance—a struggle to be predator rather than prey.

Accordingly, contemporary violations of international norms, including acts such as the extraterritorial abduction of political leaders, should not be viewed as anomalies. They are consistent with a system in which states prioritize national interest over legal or moral constraints. When legal frameworks no longer serve those interests, powerful states face few effective deterrents against their violation. In this context, international law functions less as an enforceable system of justice and more as an instrument available to those capable of leveraging it strategically. Its efficacy depends not on normative legitimacy alone, but on the distribution of power within the international system.

Conclusion

In conclusion, appeals to “humanity” in international politics call for critical scrutiny. Humanity does not denote inherent moral goodness; rather, it signifies capacity. Human beings are capable of extraordinary altruism, but also of unparalleled cruelty. Self-interest, violence, and the instinct for survival are as much a part of the human condition as cooperation and compassion.

The first recorded act of human violence, the killing of one of Adam’s sons by the other, serves as a foundational metaphor for this duality. Against this backdrop, expressions of shock at contemporary acts of coercion or abduction appear less as moral awakenings and more as selective indignation. Humanity, therefore, should not be understood as synonymous with moral restraint, but as the potential for both the highest good and the deepest evil.