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وحدة الدراسات السياسية

Africa’s 2025 Security Landscape: Security Dynamics and India’s Strategic Influence

By - Admin يناير 1, 2026 Comments (0) 14 Mins Read
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Meriam Hssaini

 Faculty of Legal, Economic and Social Sciences, Cadi Ayyad University

 Morocco

 

Executive Summary

Resilience. This is the prevailing state of Africa in 2025. The continent has demonstrated a realistic capacity to achieve stability, adapt, and play an effective role in its security environment despite ongoing conflicts in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel. Through integration via the African Union and Regional Economic Communities (RECs), African states have enhanced continental coordination, practical peacekeeping, and crisis management. Furthermore, they have exploited selective external alliances with India, the European Union, and the United States.

Currently, “negative peace” frameworks prevail: conflicts are managed rather than completely eliminated, with stability and economic continuity prioritized. In India’s case, Africa has served as a dual-use strategic hub where neutral, stable engagement and institutional capacity building are linked to maritime security and counterterrorism training. This engagement is utilized to protect both regional and Indian interests. Africa in 2025 is not merely a passive actor; it is increasingly shaping its own security environment, balancing sovereignty, strategic alliances, and pragmatic coexistence within an unstable international system.

Keywords: Africa, security environment, sovereignty, conflicts, peacekeeping.

Introduction

Africa in 2025 is at the heart of a global strategic and security reorientation. The continent suffers from chronic instability, with the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, and even parts of Central Africa mired in protracted conflicts due to insurgencies, weak governance, and complex regional rivalries. At the same time, Africa’s growing economic and geostrategic importance is attracting the attention of major powers such as India, the United States, and the European Union. These powers are concerned with the safety of trade routes, access to vital resources, and regional stability.

This dynamic has led to a dual security model in which African countries have engaged in non-alignment—specifically “transactional non-alignment.” Through various partnerships, they have been able to respond to both traditional and emerging security threats without compromising their sovereignty. The security architecture in Africa is now more African-oriented, supported by the African Union (AU) and Regional Economic Communities (RECs), such as ECOWAS, which coordinate early warning, mediation, and peacekeeping efforts. These efforts are reinforced through selective bilateral and systematic relationships between African states and external actors, providing capacity building and operational assistance without undermining strategic autonomy.

In the case of India, Africa acts as a dual-use hub, offering opportunities to build maritime security, counter-terrorism capabilities, and institutional strength, while simultaneously protecting commercial and economic interests. This brief reviews Africa’s changing security environment, the prevalence of negative peace architectures, and how India has stabilized its engagement to inform policymakers on the region’s trajectory toward 2026. The importance of this subject lies in understanding how African countries are restructuring security governance amidst increased global competition and changing conflict dynamics.

This analysis aims to review the contemporary security situation in Africa by exploring three interrelated shifts:

  1. The reshaping of continental and bilateral security frameworks.

  2. The emergence of conflict management strategies focused on “cold peace.”

  3. The growth of small, flexible security alliances.

The interaction between external actors and African-led structures is also analyzed to assess its impact on sovereignty. The problem statement addresses whether the security arrangements currently in place in Africa are capable of achieving long-term stability or if they merely address the symptoms of conflict while ignoring structural factors of insecurity.

Methodology: This research employs a mixed research design that includes descriptive and analytical studies. It utilizes academic literature, policy reviews, and confirmed reports to assess institutional progress and outcomes.

The analysis is structured to focus on three key changes followed by a conclusion.

  • First, it focuses on the reshaping of Africa’s security architecture through evolving multilateral and bilateral arrangements.

  • Second, it examines the consolidation of a “cold peace” model concerned with containing conflicts rather than comprehensive resolution.

  • Third, it discusses the emergence of small, agile security partnerships that operate outside or beyond traditional continental instruments.

  • Finally, it provides an assessment of India’s security activity as a strategic and economic partner in this evolving African security environment.

The First Shift: The New Security Architecture – Multilateral and Bilateral Agreements

By 2025, the African security architecture has reached a stage of strategic restructuring, which includes strengthening continental cooperation alongside balanced bilateral and multidimensional relations. This development represents the logic of reciprocal pragmatism, as African states selectively engage external actors to increase operational effectiveness while maintaining decision-making and structural autonomy.

According to this hybrid model, this is not a sign of fragmentation but rather an adaptive response to the increasing reach of cross-border security threats. The core of the institution remains the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which consists of the African Union Peace and Security Council (AU PSC), the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), the African Standby Force (ASF), and the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). The APSA framework remains the primary mechanism for conflict prevention, crisis response, and post-conflict stability on the continent.

A crucial development for 2025 was the convergence of sustainable African finance. The African Peace Fund’s high-level platform, as reported by Mrs. Dagmawit Moges Bekele, Director of the AU Peace Fund, had already reached US$400 million by 2025, with US$19 million disbursed to address instability in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa (AU Peace Fund, 2025). This marked a partial departure from near-absolute reliance on external donors and strengthened the continental framework’s credibility as a functional security agent.

The African Union Peace and Security Council continued to play its central role in coordination, focusing on tasks in Somalia, Sudan, and Mali. It also increased structured consultations with the Pan-African Parliament and African think tanks to build greater political legitimacy and civilian control. At the sub-regional level, ECOWAS and IGAD enhanced intelligence dissemination, collaborative planning, and logistics integration, especially concerning instability driven by coups and cross-border insurgencies.

Functionally, a gradual but positive development has been observed in the African Standby Force (ASF). The number of troops associated with ASF forces deployed or on active standby in East Africa, the Sahel, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo improved in terms of force generation and command and control operations. However, this was again limited by the level of logistical support and airlift capability, amounting to about 12,000 personnel.

The best example of African-led security is the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). By 2025, AUSSOM deployed approximately 12,626 troops from Ugandan, Kenyan, Djiboutian, Ethiopian, and Egyptian forces, focusing simultaneously on the fight against al-Shabaab and the gradual handover of national security responsibilities to the Somali National Forces (AUSSOM, 2025).

In the same vein, selective external partnerships have been established to strengthen continental mechanisms in a manner aligned with Africa’s priorities. On one hand, the EU increased funding through the European Peace Facility, which provided some €600 million for African peace missions, maritime security programs, and security sector reform programs (Council of the EU, 2022). On the other hand, the United States maintained its engagement through the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, providing training and intelligence support to make the region interoperable rather than engaging in direct combat (OIG, 2025).

Taken together, Africa’s security architecture in 2025 is multipolar, stratified, and increasingly autonomous. Despite persistent structural constraints, Africa’s ability to deal with internal and cross-border threats without losing strategic control has been bolstered by the integration of African-led institutions and external support.

The Second Shift: A “Cold Peace” Approach and Conflict Management

In 2025, “negative peace” prevailed in a number of African regions—defined as the absence of high-intensity armed conflict without a comprehensive political settlement. This represents a pragmatic shift in the nature of conflict management, where actors are more interested in regional stability and economic maintenance than in resolving acute political disputes. Rather than engaging in total war or achieving a negotiated peace, states and non-state actors navigate a fragile landscape of checks and balances characterized by the cessation of active hostilities, managed tensions, and partial foreign aid.

The Horn of Africa: Fragile Stabilization

In the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia and Eritrea were not involved in open war in 2025, but tensions remain high. Eritrea withdrew from the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), justifying this by claiming bias against Ethiopia, which highlights unresolved differences regarding sovereignty and regional influence. The peace situation is negative and conditional because Ethiopia still seeks economic access to the Red Sea, and border demarcations remain incomplete, contributing to latent hostility. According to scholars, these periods of temporary calm often mask deeper political tensions and disparate security environments (Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 2025).

Sahel Region: Suppression Without Settlement

The Sahel region was amidst similar dynamics. Permanent settlements remained elusive despite government efforts, political parties, and external interventions. The Global Terrorism Index 2025 reported that more than half of the world’s terrorism-related deaths occurred in the Sahel, concentrated in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger (Global Terrorism Index, 2025). Regional powers, such as the Alliance of Sahel States, are focusing on combining their efforts to combat outlaw organizations, prioritizing security control over political solutions. According to Reuters, coordinated appeals for a large-scale operation focused on military cooperation and economic integration were cited as priorities for addressing disputed legitimacy and insurgent threats (Reuters, 2025).

Table 1: Measures of Terrorism Impact (2024/2025 Data) (Source: Global Terrorism Index 2025)

Country GTI Rank 2025 GTI Score 2025 Deaths 2024
Burkina Faso 1 8.581 1,532
Mali 4 7.907 604
Niger 5 7.776 930
Nigeria 6 7.658 565
Chad 23 5.032 40

The data shown in Table 1 demonstrates that the Sahel region is the global epicenter of terrorism. With the highest score in the world (8.581) and 1,532 deaths in 2024, Burkina Faso’s indicators are alarmingly high, averaging around 14 deaths per incident. Niger (ranked 5th globally with a score of 7.776) recorded 930 deaths, a sharp increase marked by the world’s deadliest terrorist attack in 2019 in Tahoua. Mali (4th globally, 7.907) and Nigeria (6th globally, 7.658) face constant threats with 604 and 565 deaths respectively, while Chad (23rd globally, 5.032) recorded significantly fewer deaths (40).

This distribution of impact, as the table clearly shows, is structurally linked to distortions, competition for resources (including gold), and a radical geopolitical realignment as Western powers withdraw and new alliances form within the Sahel Alliance.

The Repercussions of “Cold Peace”

The passive peace that Africa is embracing is an indication of pragmatic coexistence rather than full reconciliation. Although it normalizes the immediate environment, it risks entrenching unresolved grievances and enabling informal armed networks. Sustainable peace requires political inclusiveness, governance reforms, and robust conflict prevention mechanisms that integrate African and selective external support to ensure stability in 2026.

The Third Shift: Small Security Alliances

By 2025, African security governance increasingly relied on small, flexible security alliances operating alongside continental institutions such as the African Union (AU) and Regional Economic Communities. These arrangements emerged in response to the operational constraints of large multilateral frameworks, prioritizing speed, technical specialization, and mission-specific cooperation.

Across the continent, states have engaged in minilateral security formats focused on counterterrorism, maritime security, cyber defense, and intelligence sharing.

  • In the Gulf of Guinea: Coastal states such as Ghana, Nigeria, and Côte d’Ivoire have intensified joint maritime patrols and intelligence coordination to counter piracy and illicit trafficking.

  • In Eastern Africa: Cooperation among Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, and external partners emphasizes maritime domain awareness and port security linked to trade corridors.

Research indicates that these compact arrangements improve operational effectiveness by reducing coordination costs and bypassing slower consensus-based institutions. BRICS+ security interactions have reinforced this trend. South Africa and Nigeria have used BRICS-linked platforms to coordinate maritime security, cyber governance, and intelligence cooperation without binding alliance structures (Abramova et al., 2025).

Crucially, these small alliances prioritize practical, industry-linked security cooperation—including infrastructure protection, energy security, and cyber resilience—rather than symbolic diplomacy. As African states confront transnational threats and intensifying global competition, minilateral security frameworks are becoming essential complements to continental mechanisms, enhancing responsiveness while preserving sovereign control over security decision-making.

India’s Perspective: Security as a Strategic and Economic Leap

In 2025, India engaged in its relations with Africa through a dual-use strategic agenda, uniting security cooperation with economic and geopolitical goals. This strategy demonstrates India’s interest in protecting trade routes, increasing counter-terrorism and cybersecurity capabilities, and cementing its position as a reliable ally in Africa’s security architecture.

One such initiative was the Africa-India Key Maritime Engagement (AIKEYME), which took place from 13 to 18 April off Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (Narayana IAS Academy, 2025). In the same vein, ten other African countries, such as Kenya, Seychelles, Mauritius, and Mozambique, joined the Indian warships INS Chennai, INS Kesari, and INS Sunayna to carry out anti-piracy measures, maritime domain awareness, and search and rescue exercises. In parallel, the INS Sunayna deployment (5 April – 8 May) included patrols and port visits to Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) in Tanzania, Mozambique, Mauritius, and the Seychelles to enhance interoperability in operations.

In this regard, India has increased capacity-building in the areas of policing, counterinsurgency, and cybersecurity through training exchanges and technical assistance, strengthening institutional resilience to threats posed by transnational actors (MP-IDSA, 2025).

Purposefully, India retains a neutral strategic engagement and cooperates in stabilizing Africa without neo-colonial interference. Examples of such non-aligned strategies include agreements like the September 2025 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Morocco (Maroc.ma, 2025). Through the integration of operational cooperation, capacity building, and strategic balance, India becomes a non-hegemonic stabilizer, ensuring trade routes, promoting regional stability, and exercising modern influence across Africa without imitating coercive alignments.

Conclusion

In 2025, Africa’s security situation is characterized by structural change rather than short-term adaptation. The continent has shifted towards a functional, multi-layered security system led by Africans, involving selective external intervention and flexible, branched cooperation. Institutions such as the African Union and Regional Economic Communities have been focal points for conflict management, although their functioning has become increasingly dependent on complementary bilateral and small arrangements that provide quick, functional results.

Such a hybrid structure is indicative of a calculated measure by African countries to maintain strategic independence while simultaneously addressing long-term and dynamic security threats. The prevalence of negative peace structures in regions like the Horn of Africa and the Sahel illustrates a focus on conflict management rather than conflict resolution. Although this strategy has reduced large-scale violence and maintained economic viability, it remains fragile.

In the absence of political inclusiveness, governance reform, and long-term investment in prevention, managed stability risks deepening unresolved grievances and fostering long-term insecurity. Small security alliances have become important force multipliers, allowing African countries to move beyond lengthy multilateral operations and engage in specific cooperation in maritime security, counterterrorism, cyber resilience, and infrastructure protection. They are less symbolic, more functional, and represent a broader global trend in security governance.

External players, such as India, have become active in this African framework with their capabilities but without strict alliances. Looking toward 2026, sustainability will be determined by the effectiveness of African-led institutions, the evolution of negative peace settlements, and the ability of micro-partnerships to transcend temporary crisis management and foster coordination for long-term economic security and stability.

References

 

Related Tag:
Security Environment - Negative Peace - Small Security Alliances - India’s Strategic Influence.
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